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Privacy-Preserving Linkage of Genomic
and Clinical Data Sets
Dixie B. Baker, Bartha M. Knoppers , Mark Phillips , David van Enckevort , Petra Kaufmann,
Hanns Lochmuller, and Domenica Taruscio
Abstract—The capacity to link records associated with the same individual across data sets is a key challenge for data-driven
research. The challenge is exacerbated by the potential inclusion of both genomic and clinical data in data sets that may span multiple
legal jurisdictions, and by the need to enable re-identification in limited circumstances. Privacy-Preserving Record Linkage (PPRL)
methods address these challenges. In 2016, the Interdisciplinary Committee of the International Rare Diseases Research Consortium
(IRDiRC) launched a task team to explore approaches to PPRL. The task team is a collaboration with the Global Alliance for Genomics
and Health (GA4GH) Regulatory and Ethics and Data Security Work Streams, and aims to prepare policy and technology standards to
enable highly reliable linking of records associated with the same individual without disclosing their identity except under conditions in
which the use of the data has led to information of importance to the individual’s safety or health, and applicable law allows or requires
the return of results. The PPRLTask Force has examined the ethico-legal requirements, constraints, and implications of PPRL, and has
applied this knowledge to the exploration of technology methods and approaches to PPRL. This paper reports and justifies the findings
and recommendations thus far.
Index Terms—Data matching, privacy, privacy-preserving record linkage, record linkage
Ç
1 INTRODUCTION
PRIVACY-PRESERVING Record Linkage (PPRL) [1] addressestwo primary challenges that lie at the intersection of bio-
medical research and clinical practice:
1. The de-duplication and linking of datasets for use
by researchers, without disclosing the participant’s
identity; and
2. The re-identification of research participants for clin-
ical purposes, such as to return results that may be
useful in clinical diagnosis or treatment.
In 2016, the Global Alliance for Genomics and Health
(GA4GH) (genomicsandhealth.org) launched a task team to
explore ethical questions, regulatory requirements, and
technological methods and approaches related to PPRL.
The task team is a collaboration in which the GA4GH (Reg-
ulatory and Ethics Work Stream and the Data Security
Work Stream) is preparing policy and technology
standards, together with the Interdisciplinary Committee
of the International Rare Diseases Research Consortium
(IRDiRC) to enable highly reliable linking of coded data
records associated with the same individual without dis-
closing the identity of that individual except under condi-
tions in which the use of the data has led to information of
importance to the individual’s safety or health, and applica-
ble law allows or requires the return of results.
The primary motivation of the GA4GH in this endeavour
is its conviction that because linkage enables the creation,
availability, and precision of data, it therefore improves the
quality of both research and the health care provided to
people. The GA4GH believes that this reinforces the right to
share in scientific advancement and its benefits as guaran-
teed by Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rihts, as mobilized in the GA4GH Framework for Responsible
Sharing of Genomic and Health-Related Data [2].
2 ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
2.1 Sensitivity Considerations or Centralization
The ability to conveniently link data can itself dramatically
increase the risk of breach, because it carries with it a corre-
sponding boost in various adversaries’ motivation to access
the more valuable data sets. State and non-state actors alike
will hardly be able to pass up the chance to access compre-
hensive, centralized (or centralizable) global repositories.
Any PPRL system’s designers should first carefully analyze
the risks, benefits, and available safeguards based on a vari-
ety of threats.
Legal frameworks recognize risk as inherent to linkage.
Personal data held for research purposes in the Canadian
province of British Columbia, for example, can be linked only
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if “any data linkage is not harmful to the individuals who are
the subjects, . . . and benefits . . . are clearly in the public inter-
est” [3], [4], [5]. Article 35 of the European Union’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has the effect of requiring
that a data protection impact assessment be carried out prior
to putting in place an international PPRL system” [7].
Data aggregation through linkage runs the risk of inadver-
tently transforming into identifiable data, data that were not
previously perceived as reasonably foreseeably identifiable.
Linkagemethods should thus either includemetrics for mea-
suring the level of protection or offer alternative safeguards.
2.2 Generating Linkage Data
The simplest method of linking data about an individual is
to assign to the individual a unique identifier that is derived
from a relatively immutable set of the individual’s personal
data and that would irrefutably be associated with the indi-
vidual and her data wherever they may go. Although sev-
eral countries have moved toward the approach, it has often
been accompanied by controversy, and this approach is nei-
ther legally nor politically feasible in global health-related
data sharing. The most direct impediment is that a number
of laws require or recommend that identifiers not be gener-
ated on the basis of personal information [6], [7].
Amore privacy-conscious approach to linkage is to associ-
ate the immutable personal data with a randomly generated
pseudonym that will serve as the unique identifier associated
with all the individual’s records. In thisway, linking the pseu-
donym with anything about the person will be impossible
without first having access to the relevant immutable data.
But this approach suffers from its own legal and practical
shortcomings. Since the goal of the exercise is to link as many
data sets as possible, and since data collection is rapidly
increasing, a correspondingly larger number of peoplewould
necessarily have access to the immutable data in question,
thus creating a major vulnerability in the privacy-protection
scheme. The law in many jurisdictions reflects the reality of
this danger. For example, since 1999, the US Congress has in
its appropriations bills consistently prohibited the use of fed-
eral funds to create a standard, unique health identifier.
In the European Union, although the General Data Protec-
tion Regulation, like the Data Protection Directive before it,
empowers member states to adopt frameworks for an
“identifier of general application,” few have done so. The
provision in the Regulation adds a new condition that despite
any national framework, such identifiers “shall be used only
under appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of
the data subject pursuant to this Regulation.” The existing
interpretive guidance additionally suggests avoiding the use
of the same pseudonym across different datasets [7].
PPRL will have to turn to methods other than those that
suffer from the shortcomings described above.
2.3 Participant Withdrawal
The design of an effective PPRL system should also include
robust support for participant withdrawal. This right arises
strongly in research ethics, medical ethics, and data protec-
tion. The GDPR explicitly requires that it must “be as easy
to withdraw as to give the consent” [7]. The right to
informed consent, whether in research ethics, medical liabil-
ity, or data protection, always includes an inalienable right
to revoke consent at any moment, limited only by the
impossibility of changing the past.
Withdrawal poses special challenges with respect to the
use of immutable data as identifiers, hash values derived
from immutable data, and Bloom filters [1] that use immuta-
ble identifiers to link data. The right to withdraw also poses
pernicious difficulties in distributed, complex systems
where distinct entities link, aggregate, or share existing data
sets without a uniformly enforced governance policy that
specifically enables participant withdrawal.
Although retroactive withdrawal is generally not possi-
ble, prospective withdrawal is essential. Systems should be
designed to allow participants or patients to withdraw their
consent to the processing of their personal data without the
risk of their previously linked data “re-emerging”when their
data are re-entered into the system in some future time. This
can be a challenge for hash-based systems in some configura-
tions, particularly when the underlying metadata are simply
removed from the index and not removed from the system.
These difficulties are not technically insurmountable, but a
PPRL system should include a means of ensuring that the
participant is able to withdraw her consent at any time.
2.4 Returning Results to Participants
Secondary use of large, health-related data sets, particularly
those that include genomic data, presents the possibility of
inadvertent discovery of a previously unknown health-risk
factor that affects the participant. These health risks may be
more or less serious, or more or less preventable.
While participant re-identification for return-of-results
may be prohibited, or the participant’s “right not to know”
may need to be enforced, in other ethico-legal contexts, the
ability to return results to participants in situations where a
serious, preventable condition is discovered may be manda-
tory. Therein lies the challenge.
A PPRL system thus should be designed to accommodate
both possibilities—prohibited re-identification and a required
re-identification capability. The most obvious approach
would be to design a distributed PPRL system such that the
re-identification entity is optional so that, for example, in juris-
dictions where re-identification is prohibited, this capability
can be omitted. Whatever the approach taken, care must be
taken to appropriately account for the potential that a partici-
pant has his data held simultaneously by multiple entities,
some of which allow re-identification while others prohibit it,
to help ensure that the overall system can most optimally
complywith the diverging requirements.
3 TECHNICAL METHODS AND APPROACHES
3.1 Desired Features and Attributes
The joint GA4GH–IRDiRC effort aims to identify and recom-
mend for further consideration one or more approaches to
enable linkage of coded1 data across organizations such that
1. This article uses the term “coded” to describe records or other
data whose personal identifiers have been removed and replaced with
a re-identification code that is generated independently of the values of
identity attributes. Coding requires not only the removal of direct iden-
tifiers, but also indirect (or quasi-) identifiers, thereby making it impos-
sible to derive the participant’s identity without access to the
information associating the code with an individual. Coding, according
to this definition, is a form of pseudonymisation.
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even though records have been linked, no information about
the identity of the individual to whom the data pertain can
be ascertained unless the relevant research project has cho-
sen to allow its participants’ identities to be disclosed in the
limited circumstances where disclosure corresponds to the
individual’s wishes or where required by law. Consistent
with the ethico-legal considerations discussed above, the fol-
lowing desired features and attributes were identified:
 The approach should recognize, with a high degree
of confidence, coded records associated with the
same individual.
 The approach should be applicable to any data type
(e.g., text, clinical data, images, genomic data).
 The approach should use a linkage algorithm that
does not require the knowledge of the individual’s
direct identifiers.
 The approach should not inherently fail to recognize
records associated with the same individual due to
spelling differences, typographical errors, missing
and out-of-date data, and other minor irregularities.
 The approach should enable a participant to limit
linkages to her data.
 The approach should use techniques that are resistant
to re-identification attacks (e.g., frequency, dictio-
nary, cryptanalysis), while enabling re-identification
when required and authorized.
 The approach should enable an assessment of link-
age quality and completeness.
 The approach should be scalable and distributable,
allowing linkage of very large datasets across multi-
ple organizations.
 The approach should have been implemented for
use, and not simply theoretical.
3.2 Current State of Knowledge and Practice
Within research environments like those in which GA4GH
and IRDiRC generally work, PPRL is most often used for
the purpose of creating a research dataset in which all
records pertaining to the same person are linkable, even as
the identity of the person remains unknown to the research-
ers. Accomplishing this presents two different kinds of chal-
lenges in an international ecosystem that highly values
privacy. The first relates to legal restrictions that sometimes
regulate the collection, use, and disclosure of specific attrib-
utes including a person’s name, gender, birthdate, and place
of birth, such as in HIPAA. The second is that the more
records a data set contains pertaining to the same individ-
ual, the easier it will be to identify that individual—a prob-
lem called statistical disclosure control. This tendency
simultaneously empowers Big Data analytics.
Experts studying identifiability distinguish between direct
identifiers such as a person’s personal unique identifier
(PUID) and, in most contexts, their name, on the one hand,
and quasi-identifiers (QIDs), such as gender, date of birth, and
address, on the other. If a one-to-one mapping of individual-
to-code is likely possible, the code is considered a direct iden-
tifier. QIDs also, however, play an important role in PPRL.
To be most useful, the records to be linked need to include
a common set (or subset) of attributes, and the attributes need
to be expressed such that they are recognizable across data
sets (e.g., spelling consistency, common metadata, controlled
vocabulary). PPRL involving Big Data, such as genomic data,
presents additional challenges, including scalability, linkage
quality, and increased privacy risk [8]. In some contexts, these
challenges can be addressed by pre-processing techniques,
such as those described byChristen [9].
Record linkage is generally accomplished using one of
three basic types of protocols [9]:
1. Two-party protocols are used when only two data-
base owners want to link their data.
2. Three-party protocols are used when two parties are
assisted by a trusted third party, enabling the linkage
to occur without either party seeing the other’s data.
3. Multi-party protocols are used to link more than two
data sets, and may involve a trusted third party.
3.3 PPRL Techniques
PPRL techniques have evolved over time. First-generation
techniques (mid-1990s) were primarily based on exact
matching using simple hash encoding. The U.S. National
Institutes of Health (NIH) Global Unique Identifiers (GUID)
approach is an example of this technique [10]. These techni-
ques are challenged by the fact that a single-letter difference
in the attribute values used will yield dramatically different
hash values.
Second-generation techniques (early 2000s) rely upon
approximate matching and include comparisons of edit dis-
tances and other string-comparison functions. The principal
limitation of these techniques is scalability. Third-generation
techniques (mid-2000s) take scalability into account and
often represent a compromise between privacy-protection
and scalability; these techniques may allow for some infor-
mation leakage [9].
A large number of matching approaches and protocols
have involved some combination or extensions of the fol-
lowing techniques [9]:
 Secure hash encoding. This is done using a crypto-
graphic hash function (i.e., a one-way algorithm that,
given any size string of characters as input, will pro-
duce a unique, repeatable, fixed-size output). Hash
functions play a major role in PPRL because of their
ability to reliably confirm matching inputs without
directly revealing any information about the content
of those inputs. However, dictionary and frequency
attacks are possible and are generally mitigated by
injecting a random value known as a “salt” into the
output. Also, hash functions test only exact matches
andhave no inherent capacity to handle nearmatches.
 Statistical linkage key (SLK). An SLK is a derived vari-
able generated from components of direct and indi-
rect identity elements. The SLK-581 [11], developed
by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare to
link health datasets, is an example of a statistical
linkage key. The format of the complete SLK-581 is
XXXZZDDMMYYYYM—where XXX is the individu-
al’s family name, ZZ is the given name, date of birth
is represented as DDMMYYYY, and gender is repre-
sented as M, F, or U. SLK-based masking has been
shown to provide limited privacy protection and
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poor sensitivity [9]. Also, because an SLK comprises
identity elements, it would not meet the GA4GH
requirements that the approach “not require knowl-
edge of the individual’s identity” and “use techni-
ques that are resistant to re-identification attacks.”
 Encryption schemes. These approaches involve the use
of encryption algorithms to link data. For example,
secure multi-party computation (SMC) is a crypto-
graphic method in which multiple parties jointly
compute a function while keeping their individual
inputs private. During the computation, each partici-
pating party computes part of the function, and in
the end, each party knows only the end result and its
own input.
 Bloom filter. In this approach, hash values are loaded
into a vector, which is then compared with other
vectors similarly generated, resulting in either a
“definite no” or a “perhaps yes” match. The method
was first defined by Schnell, whose paper provides a
detailed description of how Bloom filters work [1].
Bloom-filter encoding has been widely used as an
efficient technique for matching records without
sacrificing privacy [1], [9], [10].
3.4 Challenges
Several challenges to accurate and efficient record-linkage
have been identified. Van Grootheest et al. [12] studied
record-linkage performance under simulated conditions
and found that linkage performance is dependent upon the
algorithm used, the choice of linkage variables, the dataset
size and overlap, and errors in datasets. Although person-
ally identifiable information (PII), such as date of birth and
name at birth, often is considered immutable, mistakes and
discrepancies in recording the information, language and
spelling differences, and variations in format render it
mutable nonetheless. Some have turned to biometric data
(e.g., fingerprint, DNA) as more immutable for the purpose
of linkage. However, this approach can pose its own chal-
lenges, including significant privacy risk, collection cost,
and inconvenience.
Some approaches are technically interesting, but may be
computationally impractical. In particular, approaches
involving asymmetric encryption of large quantities of data
are computationally intensive. Hardware-based encryption,
which implements encryption algorithms in hardware
rather than software, dramatically improves the efficiency
of encryption solutions; however, software-based solutions
are more cost-effective and therefore more widely used. For
several decades, homomorphic encryption has held promise
for data linking, but has been prohibitively time consuming.
Recent advances hold promise for the practical use of homo-
morphic encryption for data linkage purposes [13].
PPRL approaches are susceptible to several adversarial
models and attack methods, such as dictionary attacks, fre-
quency attacks, cryptanalysis attacks, and collusion [9]. As
with any system, assessing the security and resilience of any
PPRL system may require multiple approaches, depending
upon the mechanisms used, the architecture of the system,
and the intended use.
Another PPRL challenge is the need to design the system
such that linkages can be destroyed or modified once they
are established. Such a mechanism might be desirable, for
example, to enable new pseudonyms to be reassigned to
individuals who were affected by a security breach, to delete
a synonym when a participant revokes consent to use her
data, or to re-identify and re-contact an individual to provide
him with important health-relevant results. This challenge is
sometimes addressed by using a hash value as an internal
(protected) intermediate value that is associated with an
independent, randomly generated identifier that is distrib-
uted and used as a pseudonym, with the ability to be reas-
signed at will. This approach enables a pseudonym to be
revoked or changed without affecting every individual in
the data set, so long as the hash value itself remains secure.
3.5 Current Approaches
U.S. National Institutes of Health Global Unique Identifier. The
US National Institutes of Health (NIH) developed the
Global Unique Identifier (GUID) Tool as a customised,
client–server software application used to a Global Unique
Identifier (GUID) for each study participant. The GUID is a
subject pseudonym designed to allow a researcher to share
data specific to a study participant without exposing per-
sonally identifiable information (PII), and to match partici-
pants across labs and research data sets.
To generate a GUID, the data holder enters a number of
PII data elements, including gender, name, and birth loca-
tion, which are used to generate a hash value that the data
holder sends to the GUID server. If the hash value matches
an existing entry in the GUID index, the associated GUID
pseudonym is returned to the data holder. If the hash value
does not match an existing entry, a new GUID is randomly
generated and returned.
No PII ever leaves the data holder. Because the GUID is
randomly generated, no attacker could infer the identity of
the individual based on the GUID alone. The same individ-
ual’s information will produce the same GUID across time,
location, and research context, allowing researchers to
match shared data regardless of its source without sharing
or viewing PII [10]. However, an attacker with knowledge
of the data elements used to generate the hash value, and
with access to a GUID client, could generate the hash value
and then query the server to retrieve the GUID associated
with that individual, thus allowing the attacker to re-
identify the participant in any pseudonymised data set to
which he can obtain access.
Mainzelliste (Germany). Mainzelliste is an open-source,
RESTful service for pseudonymisation developed at the
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz. A user inputs PII
(e.g., name, date of birth) and receives back a pseudonym
generated using data unrelated to the identifiable elements.
The pseudonymisation service maintains a database of iden-
tifiable data stringsmatched to pseudonyms. Upon receiving
the identifiable elements, the service performs a lookup to
determine whether a pseudonym already exists. The lookup
runs a linkage algorithm to account for near matches (e.g.,
typographical errors). If a match is found, the service returns
the existing pseudonym. If no match is found, the service
generates and returns a new pseudonym [16], [17].
Linkage is possible even in the event of typos or alternate
spellings. Mainzelliste allows for the possibility of using in-
house phonetic codes and string comparisons for linkage,
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thereby allowing names from other linguistic backgrounds
to be fault-tolerantly compared. Currently, weight-based
record linkage is supported, but the modular concept allows
for retrofitting an in-house algorithm. The possibility to
manually rework uncertain assignments further supports
the automatic matching process [9].
European Patient Identity Management. The European
patient-identity management solution (EUPID) approach
addresses the risk associated with the GUID system, as
described above, by using context-specific data elements and
hashing algorithms to generate a context-specific pseudo-
nym for each individual. The context-specific pseudonyms
then are linked within the EUPID system and associated
with a linkage pseudonym, without revealing the context-
specific pseudonyms included in the association.
The EUPID approach, originally developed by the Euro-
pean Network for Cancer Research in Children and Adoles-
cents (ENCCA), was designed to meet the following
requirements:
 Prevent duplicate registration of patients.
 Preserve the capability to re-identify subjects by a
trusted third party in special cases.
 Support the capability to use different pseudonyms
for the same patient in different contexts, while pre-
serving the capability for a trusted third party to link
datasets pertaining to the same patient and stored
under different pseudonyms—while assuring that
patient identification in any single context is nearly
impossible from another context.
 Avoid creating a transparent universal patient ID.
 Assure that the approach can be implemented in a
distributed computing environment.
The EUPID scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1, fromNitzlnader
and Schreier [15], which provides detail regarding the meth-
odology and how the EUPID linkage is generated and used
in actual practice. A key feature is context-specific pseudo-
nymisation, which maintains identity linkages locally, while
enabling re-identification of a linked data set through a three-
party collaboration involving the local context, the linkage
agent, and a trusted third party. EUPID combines several of
the PPRL matching techniques discussed in Section 3.3 to
identify linkages, and an optional trusted third party to
enable re-identification as authorized.
4 DISCUSSION
PPRL techniques and approaches generally use either a
direct identifier (PUID) or a quasi-identifier (QID). The use
of this information is regulated throughout the world under
applicable jurisdictional laws and institutional policies. The
mere centralization of data presents privacy challenges. In
addition, considerations such as the need to enable partici-
pants to withdraw from a research study and the various
policies relating to the return of results must be factored
into the design of a PPRL approach and implementation.
Any PPRL approach must consider privacy risks inherent
in its methods. A hash value generated using PUID or QID
cannot be used as a pseudonym because the hash value is
derived from personal data, which often is prohibited by
applicable law or regulation. Also, use of a hash value as a
pseudonym that does not allow re-identificationmay be illegal
in some contexts due to the right of participants to withdraw,
to access their own data, and to receive the results of research
performedusing their data returnedwhen so desired.
Some of the technical approaches examined generate a
random or quasi-random pseudonym, and store an associa-
tion between the generated pseudonym and a hash value
derived from PII. In this way, no participant can be identi-
fied on the basis of the pseudonym alone. However, a
unique linkage between a PII-based hash value and a pseu-
donym leaves open the possibility of using the linkage sys-
tem to reverse-discover the pseudonym associated with a
known individual.
The Bloom filter approach may be less vulnerable to this
type of reverse-discovery attack if a large number of hash
functions and a sufficiently long filter are used [9]. The
Bloom filter approach produces quantitative values reflect-
ing the strength of the match, and has been shown to pro-
duce linkages comparable to those produced by traditional
methods using unencrypted identity attributes [12].
The hope behind these initiatives is to simultaneously
safeguard privacy while also furthering open data ideals
such as the FAIR principles (not to be confused with FIPP,
the Fair Information Practice Principles, discussed below),
which demand that data be Findable,Accessible, Interopera-
ble, and Reusable [18]. Since their emergence in the scientific
context, FAIR principles have been recognized as particu-
larly important where health-related data are concerned.
It is important to recognize that the very act of linking
records pertaining to the same individual may make them
easier to identify. Indeed, this is why many research pro-
grams require a minimum “bin size” or “cell size”—i.e.,
that a minimum number of individuals be represented in
any bar in a histogram (“bin”) or any single “cell” in a
spreadsheet. Linking two records within a “bin” essentially
reduces the bin size, and increases privacy risk. In addition,
a trusted third-party (used in all 3 of the implementations
discussed above) becomes an attractive target for attackers.
Fig. 1. The ENCCA Unified Patient Identifier (EUPID) approach enables
the use of context-specific pseudonyms (PIDs), while preserving the
capability for a trusted third party to link PIDs pertaining to the same indi-
vidual, through the use of indexed EUPIDs [15].
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A strong data-linkage approach should conform to the
“principle of least privilege” wherein each entity has access
to only those data and system privileges it needs to perform
its assigned functions. EUPID takes a step in the right direc-
tion through its context-based pseudonymisation and col-
laborative approach to re-identification. But all three of the
approaches discussed in Section 3.5 include a single point
of failure. Methods that distribute trust across entities, such
as multi-party computation (MPC) and federation, are
potential avenues for addressing this vulnerability.
As in other areas of data-sharing, no technical solutions
on their own can ensure both data privacy and data sharing.
Any workable international PPRL solution will require
strong privacy policy, enforceable through the combined
use of technical methods, like those discussed above, and
robust organizational and governance measures, perhaps
taking inspiration from the Fair Information Practice Princi-
ples (FIPPs) that undergird most international privacy law.
5 RECOMMENDATIONS
After considering the methods and approaches discussed
above, the PPRL Task Force concluded that the EUPID
approach held the most promise for the emerging, global
GA4GH and IRDiRC research environment. In particular,
the Task Force was impressed with EUPID’s use of context-
specific identity attributes, hashing functions, and pseudo-
nyms to localize privacy risk, and its use of phonetic hashing
to enable robust linking. Themodel in principle can be feder-
ated and scaled to accommodate other consortia and data-
sharing efforts. In addition, the model’s “re-identification”
capability could be offered as an optional module for con-
texts that require the capability to learn the identity of a
research participant under special circumstances, and with
appropriate authorisation.
The PPRL Task Force is collaborating with the EUPID
project to deepen its understanding of the EUPID model
and to further explore its use. A security review is planned
as well as an investigation of the feasibility of using secure
multi-party computation (SMC) as part of the federation
model.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported in part by the Can-SHARE proj-
ect, which is in turn supported by Genome Quebec, Genome
Canada, the government of Canada, the Ministere de
l’Economie, Innovation et Exportation du Quebec, and the
Canadian Institutes of Health Research (fund #141210).
REFERENCES
[1] R. Schnell, “Privacy-preserving data linkage,” Methodological
Developments in Data Linkage, K. Harron, H. Goldstein, and
C. Dibben, eds. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley, 2016, pp. 201–225.
[2] Global Alliance for Genomics and Health, “Framework for




[3] Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, Revised Stat-
utes of British Columbia 1996, chapter 165, sections 35(1)(b), 36.1
(1).
[4] E-Health Act, Statutes of British Columbia 2008, chapter 38, section
14(2.1)(d).
[5] Personal Information Protection Act, Statutes of British Columbia
2003, chapter 63, section 21(1)(c).
[6] Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(U.S.), Public Law No. 104–191, US Statutes at Large, vol. 110,
pp. 1936ff, 1996.
[7] General Data Protection Regulation, Official Journal of the European
Union, vol. 59, L 119/1. 2016.
[8] D. Vatsalan, Z. Sehili, P. Christen, and E. Rahm, “Privacy-
preserving record linkage for big data: Current approaches and
research challenges,” Handbook of Big Data Technologies. Berlin,
Germany: Springer, 2016.
[9] P. Christen, “Privacy-preserving record linkage,” ScaDS Leipzig,
2016, [Online]. Available: http://users.cecs.anu.edu.au/christen/
publications/christen2016scads.pdf
[10] National Institutes of Health, “Global unique identifier (GUID),”
2016, [Online]. Available: https://data-archive.nimh.nih.gov/
guid/
[11] Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, “SLK-581 Guide for
use,” Australian government, Jul. 2016, [Online]. Available:
https://www.aihw.gov.au/getmedia/cf980d57-c72f-4925-b1fc-
36be6e80d3cd/aodts-nmds-2017-18-slk-581-guide.pdf.aspx
[12] G. van Grootheest, M. C. H. de Groot, D. J. van der Laan,
J. H. Smit, and B. F. M. Bakker, “Record linkage for health studies:
Three demonstration projects,” 2015, [Online]. Available: http://
www.biolink-nl.eu/public/2015_recordlinkageforhealthstudies.
pdf
[13] L. Hardesty, “Securing the cloud: A new algorithm solves a major
pproblem with homomorphic encryption, which would let web
servers process data without decrypting it,” MIT News, 2013,
[Online]. Available: http://news.mit.edu/2013/algorithm-solves-
homomorphic-encryption-problem-0610
[14] M. Lablans, A. Borg, F. €Uckert, “A RESTful interface to pseudonym-
ization services inmodernweb applications,” BMCMed. Inf. Decision
Making, vol. 15, no. 2, 2015, doi: 10.1186/s12911-014-0123-5.
[15] M. Nitzlnader, G. Schreier, “Patient identity management for sec-
ondary use of biomedical research data in a distributed comput-
ing environment,” eHealth2014 – Health Informatics Meets eHealth,
A. H€orbst, et al., eds., Amsterdam, The Netherlands: IOS Press,
2014, doi:10.3233/978-1-61499-397-1-211, [Online]. Available:
https://eupid.eu/assets/downloads/nitzlnader2014.pdf
[16] “Mainzelliste,” [Online]. Available: https://mainzelliste.de
[17] Institute of Medical Biostatics, Epidemiology, and Informatics
(IMBEI), “Mainzelliste as an open source service,” University
Medical Center of the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz




[18] FORCE11, “Guiding principles for findable, accessible, interoper-
able and re-usable data publishing version b1.0,” [Online]. Avail-
able: https://www.force11.org/node/6062
Dixie B. Baker received the PhD degree in special education from the
University of Southern California. She is a Senior Partner at Martin,
Blanck, and Associates. Her research interests include health informa-
tion management, digital security, and genomic data sharing.
Bartha M. Knoppers received the PhD degree in law from the Universite
de Paris I, Pantheon-Sorbonne. She is the director of the Centre of
Genomics and Policy at McGill University. Her research interests include
governance, genomic medicine, and human rights.
Mark Phillips, received the B.C.L./LL.B. degree in law from McGill Uni-
versity and BS degree in computer science from the University of Mani-
toba. He is an academic associate at the Centre of Genomics and Policy
at McGill University. His research interests include data protection, identi-
fiability, and open data.
David van Enckevort received the Drs. degree in classical archaeology
from the University of Leiden. He is a technical project lead at the Univer-
sity Medical Center Groningen. His research interests include biomedical
science, system administration, and network administration.
BAKER ETAL.: PRIVACY-PRESERVING LINKAGE OF GENOMIC AND CLINICAL DATA SETS 1347
Petra Kaufmann received the doctorate degree in medicine from the
University of Bonn. She is the clinical innovation director at the National
Institutes of Health NCATS Division of Clinical Information. Her research
interests include neuromuscular diseases, clinical research, and clinical
trials.
Hanns Lochmuller received the doctorate degree in medicine from the
Ludwig-Maximilians-University of Munich. He is a professor at Newcastle
University. His research interests include molecular genetics, inherited
myopathies, and neuromuscular junction disorders.
Domenica Taruscio received the M.D. degree in medicine from the Uni-
versity of Bologna. She is director of the National Centre for Rare Dis-
eases at the Istituto Superiore di Sanita. Her research interests include
histopathology, bioethics, and human genetics.
" For more information on this or any other computing topic,
please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
1348 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGYAND BIOINFORMATICS, VOL. 16, NO. 4, JULY/AUGUST 2019
